Refutation of idealism

G.E. Moore, a realist and common sense philosopher, aimed to refute idealism and establish the reality of objects in the external world in his article “Refutation of Idealism.” Moore asserts that the existence of objects is real, and our commonsense beliefs are true.

Despite not examining the basic tenets of idealist philosophy, which posit that reality is fundamentally spiritual, Moore argues that if he can demonstrate that the proposition “Esse Est Percipi” is false, the entire foundation of idealist philosophy would crumble. Idealism hinges upon the fundamental thesis that “to be is to be perceived,” implying that the existence of the external world is inseparable from perception. Moore expands the definition of “Percipi” to include thought, thereby challenging the entire scope of idealist philosophy.

In an attempt to condemn the idealist thesis “Esse Est Percipi”, Moore employs both logical or analytic and metaphysical methods.

Analytical Method

Using the analytic method, Moore examines various alternative meanings of the expression “Esse Est Percipi” and finds that the proposition does not hold true. The crucial word in the proposition is “Percipi“, which normally means sensations or sense-perception. However, Moore takes it in a broader sense to mean thought in order to refute the entire idealist philosophy.

Moore further examines the conjoining word “Est“, which has at least three meanings: identity, partial identity, and inference. Thus, the proposition “Esse Est Percipi” may mean that existence of a thing is its sense perception.

1. If taken in the first sense, Esse and Percipi are synonyms and identical in meaning.
2. If taken in the second sense, Esse and Percipi, though not identical, are so related that percipi is essentially part of the meaning of esse. Therefore, either in the sense of identity or partial identity, Esse and Percipi are co-existent.

Moore argues that the proposition “Esse Est Percipi” in the first two senses is merely a tautology. It maintains the necessary relation between Esse and Pereipi, just as bachelor is necessarily related to an unmarried male. However, it removes all distinctions between the two and makes them synonyms. Therefore, the proposition becomes sterile and non-productive as far as knowledge is concerned.

3. In the third alternative interpretation of “Esse Est Percipi,” where existence is inferred from perception, there remains a distinction between the two concepts, as smoke and fire are related but not identical. However, such propositions are synthetic, and synthetic propositions are never logically necessary. They may be true or false depending on empirical evidence, and are not self-evident. For example, the proposition “all crows are black” may turn out to be false if a white crow is discovered.

Moore argues that if we see something, it is very likely that it exists and is perceived by someone, but this does not mean that existence is logically dependent on perception. Just as a single white crow invalidates the proposition “all crows are black,” a single instance in which existence is not perceived would invalidate the idealist position.

Thus, Moore’s logical analysis shows that the idealist position is not self-evident and that the externality of objects is not disproved. Furthermore, “Esse Est Percipi” is not a self-evident proposition.

Moore concludes that if “Esse Est Percipi” is analytic, then it is not about any state of affairs, and if it is synthetic, then it is a contingent and non-necessary position. It cannot be both analytic and synthetic.

Metaphysical Method

In his critique of idealism, Moore utilizes metaphysical arguments in addition to logical ones. 

One such argument is based on the distinction between existence and awareness. Moore argues that our common sense understanding acknowledges that the sensation of blue is different from the sensation of green, even though the visual mechanism for both sensations is the same. This implies that the difference is due to the objects themselves, rather than the sensations they produce. Therefore, Moore concludes that the content of awareness and awareness itself are distinct, contrary to the idealist position which conflates the two.

Moore also dismisses the idealist claim that although awareness and its content are distinguishable, they are inseparable. He contends that our experience of seeing colors, for example, shows that the object is not a part of awareness itself. Thus, it is more reasonable to say that a rose is red than to say that our consciousness is red.

Furthermore, Moore challenges the idealist view that all knowledge is mental projection. He argues that for knowledge to exist, there must be something to be known.

If knowledge is purely mental, it implies that the mind is knowing itself, which is incoherent.

Lastly, Moore posits a significant difference between mental images and objective facts. This is demonstrated by the fact that the visual image of a ferocious wild animal does not produce the same terror as actually seeing one in the forest. If there were no difference between mental images and actual objects, our reactions would be the same in both cases.

Defence of common sense

The defense of common sense has been a topic of debate in philosophy since ancient times. Philosophers such as Thales and Heraclitus deviated from common sense when they declared water and fire as the ultimate substance, respectively. Plato discredited the common sense world and instead declared the reality of the world of ideals revealed to the philosopher. However, Aristotle was the first philosopher to restore faith in some common sense beliefs.

In modern philosophy, many philosophers appeal to common sense as their ultimate judge, even when contradictory hypotheses are maintained. Descartes, for example, glorifies common sense in his Discourse on Method, yet often appeals to it for rejecting common sense beliefs. Locke endorses Descartes’ faith in common sense and appeals to it frequently. Berkeley appeals to common sense while rejecting the common sense world.

In contemporary philosophy, G.E. Moore is the strongest advocate of common sense philosophy. He defends common sense beliefs over speculative ideas and asserts that common sense beliefs are those in which every person believes. Doubt on common sense expresses doubt on a person’s mental health. Moore shows that lofty metaphysics is irrelevant to our common life and defends common sense by taking some of its statements as undoubtedly true.

Moore asserts that the reason for accepting common sense beliefs is that they are in accordance with common sense, and the reason for rejecting them is that they conflict with common sense. There is no need to give logic to prove them.

Moore’s defense of common sense is divided into two sections, which can be understood in the following philosophical language:

Section I

1. The term “common sense” refers to a collection of beliefs held true by all individuals, including those who may deny it. Moore argues that certain propositions, such as the existence of other human bodies similar to our own, are undeniable truisms that no philosopher can refute without absurdity. Philosophers themselves use language indicating their own existence and the existence of others, showing they already hold firm beliefs in these common sense propositions.

2. Common sense may also refer to beliefs commonly held by individuals but not universally held, such as belief in God or the immortality of the soul. Moore does not address such beliefs, as they are not held by all individuals without exception.

3. Common sense can also refer to propositions known indubitably without any mental effort, sometimes known as “intuition.” Moore recognizes the validity of these ordinary truths and argues for their importance, as their disregard has caused confusion about the nature of knowledge.

4. Common sense also includes certain truths that cannot be proven deductively, but which holding an opinion contrary to would result in absurdity. Moore defends such truths, pointing out the absurdity in claims that we cannot know with certainty that we exist or that other people exist. This implies that no philosophical discussions or controversies have ever occurred, as no one would have ever lived.

5. Common sense can also refer to propensities (a habit of behaving in a particular way) to believe in certain ways, even in the absence of conclusive arguments. Moore argues that certain beliefs, such as our belief in free will, are held due to such propensities.

Section II

Moore’s defense of common sense can also be interpreted as a defense of ordinary language. According to Moore, philosophical paradoxes arise from the rejection of ordinary language. When philosophers reject propositions such as “there are material things” or “there are bodies,” they are implying that these propositions have a different meaning than their ordinary understanding. This rejection of ordinary language is what Moore opposes.

Moore asserts that such propositions should not be interpreted differently from what they assert. There is no hidden or sophisticated meaning behind the ordinary language. Ordinary language is the correct language. For instance, when philosophers claim “no material things exist unperceived,” Moore would reply that it is absurd because no one perceived his bedroom while he was asleep, yet it still existed.

Similarly, when philosophers state “we do not know for certain the truth of any statement about material things,” Moore’s response would be that both of them know for certain that there are chairs in the room. It is absurd to claim that they only believe it and that it is not certain or highly probable.

Moore’s point is that in everyday language, when we use words like “material things,” we are referring to objects such as tables and chairs. In everyday language, the term “knowing” means knowing with certainty, not simply believing. Moore argues that it would be ridiculous to suggest that a person sitting on a chair only believes that they are sitting and doesn’t truly know it with certainty.

Unlike philosophers who use sophisticated language to interpret ordinary language statements, ordinary language does not misrepresent facts. Moore’s argument is that philosophical paradoxes arise when ordinary language statements are misinterpreted. When Berkeley argues that “esse est percipi,” he misinterprets ordinary language in which “there is an apple” means “an apple is physically present whether I take notice of it or not.” Most philosophical controversies result from attempts to find hidden or sophisticated meanings behind simple statements. When Moore defends common sense, he defends ordinary language as a satisfactory medium for representing facts.

However, one may question Moore’s argument that ordinary language is sufficient for expressing facts and wonder about the role of philosophers. Is all philosophical activity meaningless then?

According to Moore, philosophers are still necessary for analyzing the meaning of ordinary language statements. In his works “Some Judgments of Perception” and “The Status of Sense Data,” Moore himself analyzes ordinary judgments such as “I see a table” or “I see a chair.” He explicates the meaning of these statements and develops his theory of sense data, which posits that what we immediately see when we see an object is a “part of the surface of the object,” while the rest we infer.

Therefore, if the philosophical task is indeed to analyze the meaning of ordinary statements, then one could argue that Moore is guilty of the same error he accuses philosophers of making by trying to find new and complex meanings in ordinary statements.

Ryle observes that when we perceive an object, we directly perceive the object itself, not the sense data associated with it. We perceive tables and chairs, not “part of the surface of tables” or “part of the surface of chairs“. We do not perceive “patches of color” or “glimpses of horse races“. The meaning of seeing “robins” or horse races is self-evident and requires no profound analysis.

Ryle is also an advocate of ordinary language, striving to remove any philosophical theories or myths that have no utility in ordinary language. The theory of sense data is a philosophical myth. We never say in ordinary language that we “observe” sense data. We never say that we observe “patches of color” or “glimpses of things”. If sense data existed, there would be common expressions suited to them.

Moore believes that analyzing the meaning of ordinary language statements is necessary, even though he does not question their truth. However, his attempts to analyze statements such as “I see a table” or “I see a chair” lead him to the same level of sophistication and deviation from common sense that he attributes to his opponents. This raises the question of how Moore is different from his opponents, such as Berkeley, who also undertook an analysis and interpretation of our common-sense notion of matter found in ordinary language.

In analyzing material things such as an apple, Berkeley appeals to common sense and concludes that an apple is nothing but a jumble of qualities or ideas in the mind. He denies the physical reality of an apple independent of the mind. Moore, on the other hand, denies that the observer sees the table or the inkstand. While Moore’s analysis may be correct and Berkeley’s may be wrong, the question remains whether a common-sense approach to reality is entirely satisfactory or whether we need a philosopher to use their tools of analysis to tell us what the world is really like.

If Moore claims that ordinary language provides us with perfect access to reality via common sense, then how can he justify his sense-data theory, which is a deviation from ordinary language and another philosophical sophistication? If Moore’s philosophy adheres to ordinary language, and he does not permit any sophisticated meaning of ordinary statements, then philosophical analysis would be an illegitimate task.

Moore’s defense can be summarized as follows:

1. The common sense worldview is universally accepted.
2. We feel compelled to accept the common sense worldview.
3. Denying common sense belief leads to various inconsistencies.
4. Asserting that there is a common sense view of the world is tantamount to saying it is true.
5. One can see by inspection that common sense is self-evident.

Although there are good reasons for accepting common sense statements as true, Moore acknowledges that common sense beliefs may be false. By using clever arguments, we can prove common sense beliefs false, but it is more reasonable to hold them true.

Critical comments

Moore has faced criticism for his attempts to simplify and resolve philosophical complexities and contradictions. Some of the criticisms leveled against him include:

1. He does not provide a clear definition or list of common sense beliefs.
2. Despite claiming that these beliefs are self-evident, Moore still feels the need to provide arguments to support them. Furthermore, many of these arguments overlap with each other.
3. Some of these beliefs are rooted in superstitions or dogmas that may be refuted by scientific knowledge. Therefore, there is always the possibility of these beliefs being disproved in the future.

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